the overall mission and operations staffing of all detailing and placement functions for active and reserve personnel functions and commands; and (2) certifying that such realignments do not duplicate functions presently conducted; are cost-effective from a budgetary standpoint; will not adversely affect the mission, readiness and strategic considerations of the Navy and the Navy Reserve; and will not adversely impact on the quality of life and economic benefits of the individual serviceman.

SEC. 9069. None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be available for offshore procurement of second or third generation night vision image intensifier tubes and devices: *Provided*, That when adequate domestic supplies are not available to meet Department of Defense requirements on a timely basis, the Secretary of the service responsible for the procurement may waive this restriction on a case-by-case basis by certifying in writing to the Committees on Appropriations that such an acquisition must be made in order to acquire capability for national security purposes.

SEC. 9070. (a) Congress makes the following findings—

(1) The United States Government relies on satellites for communications, early warning of attack, monitoring compliance with arms control agreements, and many other vital national security functions;

(2) Such satellites constitute vital integral parts of many United States weapons systems, command, control and communications systems, and other military systems;

(3) It is essential to the national security of the United States that United States Government satellites not be vulnerable to anti-satellite attacks;

(4) It is in the national security interests of the United States and its allies to deter the development and testing of anti-satellite weapons by the Soviet Union;

(5) It is in the national security interests of the United States to undertake a balanced response to Soviet anti-satellite capabilities, which includes a measured ASAT program;

(6) Key agencies of the Executive Branch are examining options for specific anti-satellite arms control measures; Therefore:

(b)(1) The Executive Branch should conclude its examination of specific anti-satellite arms control options and rules of the road for Space, space activities without delay, and include its recommendations and conclusions from this examination in the report to Congress already required by the Conference Report on the Fiscal Year 1989 Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act;

(2)The President shall—with a view toward considering how to improve United States ASAT arms control monitoring capabilities—assess the national security implications for the United States of a mutual deployment of cooperative monitoring and

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verification technologies: the results of such assessment shall be included in the above-mentioned report;

(3) As soon as practicable, the President should take advantage of the forum provided by the ongoing Defense and Space Talks with the Soviet Union to explore—consistent with the conclusions of the above-mentioned report—adequately verifiable limitations on the development, testing, production, and deployment of weapons capable of directly threatening United States military satellites.

SEC. 9071. None of the funds available to the Department of Defense, including expired appropriations and M account balances,